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Abstract—In this paper we evaluate the performance of the
LoRaWAN protocol under channel-aware and channel-oblivious
jamming. We obtained three key results, namely: (i) LoRaWAN
networks are particularly vulnerable to jamming attacks, we have
shown that the network throughput of the simulation scenarios
chosen can be decreased by ∼ 56% when 25 jammers send
unauthenticated packets permanently in the network, (ii) the
gateway’s performance is dramatically affected as a consequence
of jammers. Our results suggest that the resources used to process
packets coming from jammers could be 100 times higher than
that of regular end-devices, and (iii) the network performance
impact of jammers is highly correlated with the jammer class. We
have shown that channel-oblivious jammers impacts the network
performance widely, while channel-aware jammers impact the
network locally. For this, we propose an ns-3 LoRaWAN module
extension incorporating jamming attacks.
Index Terms—LoRaWAN, IoT, Jamming, NS3, Network per-
formance, LPWAN Networks, ALOHA
I. INTRODUCTION
IoT technologies are key enablers of a huge number of
application domains in our current society. Indeed, according
to Cisco’s expectations 50 billions of devices will be connected
by 2020 [1], and according to the McKinsey Global Institute
the IoT sector could have an annual economic impact of e 3.15
trillion to e 11.1 trillion by 2025. Low Power Wide Area
Networks (LPWAN), such as LoRaWAN, SigFox and NB-IoT
are new wireless protocols that have emerged to fill the gap
left by classical wireless networks. Their main characteristic
is to provide modest data-rates and wide coverage while at the
same time offering very low power consumption.
Providing this trade-off between low power consumption
and wide coverage cannot be reached without using very
constrained end-devices (EDs). As a consequence, security
is a challenge in LPWAN. Security in LPWAN technologies
is currently provided by symmetric-key algorithms such as
AES 128 at upper levels. In the case of LoRaWAN it offers ap-
plication level payload encryption and network level integrity.
This means that, if implemented well, LPWAN networks can
reasonably be secured against MAC or upper level attacks such
as replay and DoS. But nevertheless, this does not shield them
against jammer-type attacks. A jamming attack takes place
at the PHY layer, it could be an external node that sends
random unauthenticated packets with the aim of disrupting
communications by decreasing the SINR.
In this paper, we evaluate the performance of the LoRaWAN
protocol under jamming attacks by following a simulation
Fig. 1. Top level LoRaWAN Architecture
approach. To do that we perform multiple simulations where
LoRaWAN networks are put under attack by jammers. We
evaluated both channel-aware and channel-oblivious jammers.
The former being able to sense the network and react based
on its measurements, while the latter sending unauthenticated
packets in a regular basis with the aim of disturbing the
communication between EDs and Gateways (GWs).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion II gives an overview of the LoRaWAN protocol. In section
III previous works done on jamming and LoRaWAN modeling
is presented. Section IV gives an overview of the ns3-module
extension we developed. Section V describes the simulation
scenarios and corresponding results. Finally, Section VI pro-
vides a conclusion and future directions of our work.
II. LORAWAN
LoRaWAN networks are defined in the LoRaWAN standard
(v1.0 and v1.1) [2,3]. They are designed for allowing wireless
connectivity for battery-based EDs that can be mobile or fixed.
They modulate the signals in the Sub 1 GHz ISM band using
a proprietary spread spectrum modulation, which is a variant
of a Chirp Spread Spectrum modulation (CSS). LoraWAN
networks are typically deployed in a star topology.
As shown in Fig. 1, a LoRaWAN network is composed by
EDs, Gateways (GWs), a Network Server (NS), an Application
Server (AS) and a Join Server (JS).
At the PHY layer, the band used in Europe is the g1 band
(868 − 868.6MHz) with a maximum transmission power of
14 dBm and a bandwidth of 125 kHz. EDs and GWs must
respect a duty-cycle (DC) according to the operational band.
At the MAC layer, it uses an ALOHA-type protocol. Security
in LoRaWAN is offered by means of application payload
encryption and network level authentication (AES-CMAC).
A. LoRa Time on Air
As described before, LoRaWAN Networks are subject to
DC restrictions. To manage that, it is necessary to be able toISBN 978-3-903176-18-8 ©2019 IFIP
calculate the time on air of a given modem configuration [4].
The symbol duration is given by:
Tsym = 2
SF /BW (1)
The necessary time to send a packet is given by the sum of
the preamble and payload duration:
Tpacket = Tpre + Tpay (2)
where Tpre and Tpay , are given by Eq.s (3) and (4):
Tpre = Tsym · (nbytes + 4.25) (3)
Tpay = Tsym · (8 + max (ceil(SymNb) · (CR+ 4), 0))
SymNb =
8 · PL− 4 · SF + 28 + 16 · CRC − 20 ·H
4 · (SF − 2 ·DE)
(4)
where PL is the number of payload bytes, H = 1 when
the header is enabled, DE = 1 when the low data rate
optimization is enabled, CRC = 1 when CRC is enabled and
CR the coding rate (1 to 4). The time for the received windows
is also modeled for the case where there is no confirmed traffic.
The time required to detect a preamble is given by Eq. (5) and
it is used to compute the first receive window.
Tdpre = Trx1 = Ndsym · Tsym (5)
where Ndsym = 8 for SFs 11 and 12, and Ndsym = 12 for
the others [5]. For the second receive window, we model it as
the TCAD (Channel Activity Detection) [4] given by Eq. (6).
Trx2 = TCAD = (2
SF + 32)/BW (6)
III. PREVIOUS WORKS
Most of the research done on LoRaWAN simula-
tion/modeling have been focused on characteristics such as
coverage, scalability, delay, throughput, collisions and energy
consumption [6]–[9]. However, the simulation/modeling of all
these features in LoRaWAN networks under jamming attacks
have received very limited attention.
In [8,9] a LoRaWAN ns-3 module was presented. They
modeled a LoRa-based IoT network for a typical urban sce-
nario showing that LoRa networks scale well achieving packet
success rates above 95% in presence of a number of EDs in the
order of 104. Then, they extended their work to networks with
confirmed traffic. We extended this ns3 module for LoRaWAN
networks in the presence of jamming nodes.
Regarding security issues in LoRaWAN Networks, several
works have been done for attacks at the MAC and upper
layers [10]–[12], showing that there are vulnerabilities in
LoraWAN (v1.0 and v1.1) that can be exploited. They also
proposed some countermeasures that mostly rely on the im-
plementation of cryptographic algorithms.
As regards jamming attacks in LoRaWAN. In [13] a se-
lective jamming attack on a LoRaWAN Network was imple-
mented by using commodity hardware, showing success rates
close to 100%.
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Fig. 2. Jamming Categories
With regards to collision modeling in LoRaWAN Networks,
three approaches are proposed in the literature. The first one
was proposed in [14], it considers that collisions in LoRaWAN
networks mostly occur when two or more transmissions hap-
pen at the same time with the same SF. Thus, the interference
is modeled based on co-channel rejection measurements for all
couples of SF. The second one considers that even if there are
two or more events at the same SF, a packet can be successfully
demodulated at the GW due to the capture effect [7,15].
There are some works suggesting that the frequency offset due
to hardware limitations should be considered as a parameter
when it comes to define if a collision occurred or not [7]. For
our simulations we keep the first approach proposed in [14].
In [6] the impact of interference on LoRaWAN scalability is
studied. The authors developed a simulator based on real trans-
mission measurements showing that a packet is completely lost
when the preamble is affected by the interfering packet.
Based on this literature review, we conclude that, to the
best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one that pro-
vides a detailed event-based simulator that allows to simulate
LoRaWAN Networks in the presence of jamming nodes. We
consider both channel-oblivious and channel-aware jammers.
IV. NS3-BASED MODULE FOR LORAWAN JAMMING
ATTACKS
A. Threat model
As a threat model, we consider that the jammer is not a
part of the network and that all the nodes in the network meet
the LoRaWAN standard and band restrictions. In contrast,
jammers, that from the hardware point of view have the same
characteristics as regular EDs, are capable of not following the
standard. Furthermore, as presented in Table I, we consider
both 14dBm and 20dBm as transmission power, the former
selected so that it is the same as regular nodes and the latter
allowing jammers to transmit strong enough to take advantage
of the capture-effect and to have higher jamming success rates.
As shown in Fig. 2 we classify jammers into two categories
according to their capability of sensing the medium: channel-
aware and channel-oblivious.
a) Channel-aware jammer: It listens to one of the g1
sub-bands and once it detects any activity on the channel, it
sends back a packet on the same channel and SF. The attack
timing, as shown in Fig. 3, is defined in Eq. (7):
Tjam = Tdpre + Tsw + Ttx (7)
Preamble
n Sym PHY Header PHY CRC
MAC Header
1 Byte
MAC Payload
n encrypted Bytes
MIC
4 Bytes CRC
Tdpre Tsw Ttx (Jamming)
Fig. 3. Channel-Aware jammer timing
TABLE I
THREAT MODEL - JAMMER TRANSMISSION PARAMETERS
Parameter Channel-aware Channel-oblivious
DC 1 0.2 to 1
SF 7 to 12 7 to 12
Packet Size 50 bytes 10000 bytes
Tx Power (PTXj) 20 dBm 14 dBm and 20 dBm
Packet time on air See Eq. 2
Sensitivity SX1272 [4] (same as ED)
Bands 868.1, 868.3 and 868.5 MHz
where Tdpre is the time necessary to detect a frame, Tsw
the switching time, which is the time required to switch
from reception to transmission state, and Ttx the duration of
jamming. The response time of the attack is the sum of the
two duration Tdpre and Tsw. Tdpre is modeled by using Eq. (5)
and Tsw is set as 0s, which is the ideal case.
b) Channel-oblivious jammer: This jammer does not
listen the channel, it transmits periodically on all the three
channels (one at a time) with a given DC, and it selects a
random SF each time a packet is sent.
B. Jammer modeling in NS3
To model the LoRaWAN Network and the attacker classes
described before, we take as a base the ns3 module for
LoRaWAN developed in [8] and extended in [9].We extended
this module in order to add support for jammer nodes that do
not meet the LoRaWAN standard. [16]. Jammers are capable
of:
• Not follow the regulated parameters of the corresponding
sub-band (DC, packet length and Tx power)
• Sense the medium in order to detect packets coming from
other EDs and GWs.
• Send back unauthenticated packets if a regular packet is
detected.
• Deterministically select the sub-band to transmit.
Thus, we added three classes to the ns3 module in order to
model the behaviour of a jammer:
1) Application jammer and its helper : it defines three
parameters: application period, packet length and initial
transmission delay.
2) JammerLoraMac : this class defines the MAC layer of the
jammer. In this class, jammers have the same functions
of a normal EDs but DC limitation was removed, we also
add the possibility of deterministically selecting the sub-
band for each transmission, so that it can be predefined.
3) JammerLoraPhy : This class defines the PHY layer of
the jammer. In this class we implement the Tjam, which
is time necessary to detect and send back a packet as
described previously in Eq. (7).
We also added several functions to already existing classes:
1) LoRa Phy : In this class we add three functions that
implement the timing necessary to model the behaviour
jammers, as defined in Eq.s (5), (6) and (7).
2) Lora Interference Helper: In this class we extend the
model to add support to the capture-effect. We consider
that there are two situations in which two packets are
overlapped: In the first case, the strong packet arrives
first and the radio transceiver synchronizes to it. As long
as the stronger packet’s signal-to-interference power ratio
exceed a threshold of 6 dB, it is received normally. In the
second case, the stronger packet arrives latter, the radio
transceiver synchronizes to the weak packet resulting in
both packets being lost. The selection of this threshold
and the general scheme is based on actual measurements
and from previous investigations as presented in [7,14].
As for the detection of packet losses, a packet lost is
interpreted as a consequence of three causes: (i) Packet under
sensitivity: the reception power was under the sensitivity of
the GW [17], (ii) Packet rejection: the packet was dropped at
the GW because all the 8 reception paths were occupied [8,17]
and (iii) Packet collision: we consider the model proposed
Goursaud in [14], and we also incorporated the capture-effect
as described before.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Simulation Scenarios
We considered a LoRaWAN cell consisting of several EDs
and one GW under jamming attacks. EDs are uniformly
distributed around the GW within a radius of 7500 m, which
is the maximal distance a GW can receive a packet on a
SF 12. EDs and GWs follow the requirements defined in the
SEMTECH SX1272 and the SX1301 [4,17].
The static EDs belong to Class A and there is no support
for confirmed traffic. They are configured to use the best SF
possible, so that the received power at the GW is above the
GW sensitivity. As regards the ED’s application profile, we
considered a payload length of 50 bytes, and an application
period of 30 min. The network operates in the g1 band with
a bandwidth of 125 kHz.
In regards to the jammer’s threat model, we simulate two
jammers: channel-aware and channel-oblivious as described in
Section IV and Table I.
We have considered different combinations of the number
of EDs and jammers in the LoRaWAN cell described before.
We define three different scenarios as described below with
parameters reported in Table II.
Scenario a): In this simulation scenario we evaluated the
network performance impact of channel-oblivious jammers.
We simulate a LoRaWAN network with 100 EDs and 1 GW,
the number of jammers vary from 0 to 25, and the jammer’s
DC vary from 0.2 to 1.
Scenario b): With this scenario we evaluate the impact of
channel-oblivious jammers sending packets permanently on
the GW performance. We simulate a LoRaWAN cell with 1
GW and we vary the number of EDs from 100 to 300, the
number of permanent jammers vary from 0 to 40.
TABLE II
SIMULATION SCENARIOS
Parameter Scenario a) Scenario b) Scenario c)
Number of GWs 1 1 1
GW reception Paths 8 8 8
GW sensitivity SX1301 [17] SX1301 [17] SX1301 [17]
Number of ED 100 100− 300 1000
ED’s payload length 50 bytes 50 bytes 50 bytes
ED’s packet time on air See Eq. 2 See Eq. 2 See Eq. 2
ED’s transmission Power 14 dBm 14 dBm 14 dBm
ED’s sensitivity SX1272 [4] SX1272 [4] SX1272 [4]
ED’s deployment U(0, 7500m) U(0, 7500m) U(0, 7500m)
ED’s application period 30 min 30 min 30 min
ED’s duty-cycle 0.01 0.01 0.01
Band g1 (125 kHz) g1 (125 kHz) g1 (125 kHz)
LoRaWAN class A (no ACK) A (no ACK) A (no ACK)
Jammer TX parameters See Table I See Table I See Table I
Channel-oblivious jammer 0− 25 0− 40 10, DC = 0.5
Channel-aware jammer 0 0 10
Initial transmission delay U(0, 1h) U(0, 1h) U(0, 1h)
Simulation time 1000 h 1000 h 1000 h
Tsw — — 0s
Scenario c): We simulate a LoRaWAN cell with 1 GW
and 1000 EDs. This cell was put under attack by 10 channel-
oblivious (DC = 0.5) and 10 channel-aware jammers.
B. Results
Scenario a) Fig. 4 presents the network performance of
a LoRaWAN network under channel-oblivious jamming when
varying the number of jammers, the jammers’ DC, and the
jammers’ Tx power. We considered four different performance
metrics: packet loss probability, collision probability, packet
rejection probability and network throughput.
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Fig. 4. Network performance of LoRaWAN Networks under channel-
oblivious jammers — (a) Network throughput, (b) Collision probability, (c)
Dropping probability and (d) Packet loss probability
From Fig. 4 (a) we can observe that the performance
degrades rapidly by increasing the number of jammers and
its corresponding DC. For example, in a cell configuration
with 100 EDs without jammers, the network achieves a
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Fig. 5. GW performance impact of Channel-oblivious jammers (DC=1) —
(a) GW occupancy and (b) packet forwarding rate.
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Fig. 6. ED’s throughput (packets/h) of a LoRaWAN network under jamming
attacks, I represents the GW and / represents a jammer.
throughput of 1.9 packets/min. Adding 10 jammers with a
DC = 0.6 causes this number to fall to 1.45 packets/min
and 1.50 packets/min respectively. For the worst case (25
channel-oblivious jammers with DC = 1), this number fall to
only 0.55 packets/min and 0.64 packets/min respectively.
From Fig. 4 (b) and Fig. 4 (c), we note that the vast majority
of losses are due to packet dropping at the GW. Indeed,
for the worst case considered (25 channel-oblivious, DC=1,
PTXj = 20 dBm), the proportion of packet losses due to
packet collision is only 0.10, while packet dropping is 0.60.
It should also be noted that the collision probability is
highly correlated with the jammers’ transmission power. For
example, in the case where the network is put under attack
of 25 jammers the packet loss probability is 2.1 times bigger
when the PTXj = 20 dBm. This is due to the fact that, the
signal-to-interference ratio is lower when jammers transmit
with higher transmission power.
Scenario b) Fig. 5 presents the GW performance when the
network is under channel-oblivious jammerg with a DC = 1.
We considered two metrics: the GW occupancy, defined as the
percentage of time the GW is busy processing packets, and
the packet forwarding rate, defined as the number of packets
per minute the GW can process. We compute both metrics for
packets coming from EDs and jammers.
From Fig. 5 (a), we can see that the time expend by the GW
to process packets coming from EDs decreases as the number
of jammers increases. If we consider the case where there is
only one jammer, the difference of time can be of the order
of 102. In fact, as defined by the standard, GWs act as simple
relays that do not perform any data-frame filtering in order to
discard external packets.
From Fig. 5 (b), we note that by increasing the number
of jammers, the number of EDs’ packets processed by the
gateway decreases. In fact, for a baseline cell with no jammer
and 100 EDs, the gateway is able to process 1.9 packets/min,
while for the case where there are 40 channel-oblivious
jammers with DC = 1, this number fall to only 0.13 and
0.21 packets/min respectively. This holds true for scenarios
with 200 and 300 EDs.
As regards the jammer’s transmission power, it can be seen
that for the case where 8 jammers are present in the network,
the GW is able to process 3.6 packets/min when PTXj =
20 dBm, while for the case where PTXj = 14 dBm this
number grows to 4.73.
Scenario c) Fig. 6 depicts a linear interpolation of the
throughput (in packets/h) achieved by each EDs in a Lo-
RaWAN cell from a geographical point of view. We present
this metric for the case with no jammer and for the cases in
which the cell is under attack.
Fig.6 (a), shows the baseline cell with no jammer. As
expected, EDs close to the GW achieve the highest through-
put. Inversely, EDs deployed in the periphery presents lower
performance. This is due to the fact that EDs are deployed so
that the best possible SF is selected based on the reception
sensitivity of the GW.
As for the channel-oblivious, depicted in Fig.6 (b) the net-
work performance decreases widely. The throughput achieved
by all EDs is decreased by 16.6% when adding 10 jammers
with a DC = 0.5.
Finally, for the channel-aware, the performance impact is
highly correlated with the jammers’ geographical position. In-
deed, EDs close enough to jammers experienced a throughput
reduction of 99.8%, which is consistent with experimental
implementations as presented in [13].
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have proposed an open source [16] exten-
sion of the ns-3 module for LoRaWAN presented in [8] that al-
lows to model both, channel-aware and channel-oblivious jam-
mers in LoRaWAN networks. We have evaluated the network
performance impact of each type of jammer by computing both
ED and GW side metrics. In the former we considered four
metrics: packet loss probability, collision probability, dropping
probability and normalized network throughput while in the
latter we have considered two: GW occupancy and GW for-
warding rate. The results have shown that LoRaWAN networks
are particularly vulnerable to these types of attacks. Indeed,
we have shown that for the simulation scenarios chosen, the
average throughput reached by ED can be decreased by ∼ 56%
in the worst cases when the network is put under attack by 25
channel-aware jammers with DC = 0.5.
The impact of the jammers’ transmission power on the
effectiveness of the attack is also studied. We model the
interference as the result of two phenomena: the co-channel
rejection matrix and the capture-effect. We have shown that
the probability of a packet loss caused by a collision is bigger
when jammers transmit at least 6dB higher than regular ED.
We have shown that GWs acting as pure relays is an
important vulnerability in LoRaWAN. Our results suggest that,
in the case where the network is under the attack by only
one channel-oblivious jammer, the gateway spends 100 times
more time processing packets coming from jammers than that
of legetimate EDs.
Finally, we evaluated the network performance impact from
a spatial perspective. We showed that the impact attack area
is highly correlated with the jammer-type. The results showed
that channel-oblivious jammers impact the network widely,
while reactive jammers impact the network locally.
As for the future work, we will focus on the conception
and implementation of counter-measures against jamming. For
that, we will explore solutions at the gateway level such
as authenticated preambles and also the implementation of
intrusion detection systems (IDS), using approaches such as
statistical analysis and machine-learning.
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